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Abstract
Biometric authentication technology is increasingly being adopted at a government and corporate level. Whilst
technically feasible, we seek to understand the user acceptance issues surrounding its adoption. We compare a
number of commercially available biometric techniques and develop a preliminary model of issues to be used in
further case-study research.
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INTRODUCTION
Biometric technology is considered the ultimate method of verification and identification, since it is dependent
on who you are as opposed to what you have (a token), or what you know (a password or PIN). As the issue of
security continues to grow at a global level, governments (particularly the US) are turning to biometrics to
provide identity assurance. With this publicity and emphasis on the technology, companies too are turning to
biometrics in order to secure their information and assets in this uncertain climate. From a managerial
perspective, the driver towards biometric systems adoption appears to be greater security. However, whether
such systems are acceptable from a user’s perspective has not been addressed. In this paper we compare a
number of biometric techniques across several criteria, and develop a preliminary model of issues surrounding
user acceptance of biometric systems, showing how these criteria (and others) shape such acceptance.

CURRENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY
Many biometric technologies have been put forward over time, and can generally be divided into two broad
categories: physiological and behavioural.
Physiological technologies are those based on physical
characteristics such as fingerprint, face, iris, retina, hand (geometry or veins) and palm. Behavioural
technologies rely on the unique way different people do things like speak, sign (a signature), use a mouse, or
type. Biochip technology fits into neither of these categories, and being in a very early experimental stage
(Stonehouse 2003), is not considered relevant to this research.
Since this research focuses on the commercial ‘real-world’ implementation issues of a biometric system, only
those technologies that are commercially available will be evaluated. Thus biometrics based on the retina, palm,
hand veins and mouse are also excluded – perhaps in the coming years they will become viable commercially.
The palm of the hand allows for a ‘palmprint’ to be created, utilising the feature points along the prominent lines
of the palm. Palmprints however, are not necessarily unique, unlike the well-established fingerprint. In a small
study by Duta et al (2002), there was a 5% overlap between genuine and impostor distributions. The future of
palmprints is most likely as an extra discriminator to a fingerprint system, where the fingerprint cannot be
properly collected, eg. in cases of dry skin, cuts, worn print, or missing finger.
Detecting vein patterns in the back of the hand is a relatively new technique involving a digital camera
photographing the hand that is being illuminated by infrared light. The advantages of this technique are that
veins are hidden and therefore much harder to forge than external hand geometry, are not easily damaged or
obscured, and do not place high requirements on image resolution due to their large size. The oxygenated blood
flow in the veins also provides for liveliness detection (Biometric Technology Today 2001). Whilst vein
1 SAFE: Security, Assurance, Fraud-prevention for E-business Research

Ho, Stephens, Jamieson (Paper #166)

Program at the Securities Industries Research Centre of Asia-Pacific.

14th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
26-28 November 2003, Perth, Western Australia

Page 1

patterns appear promising, there has been very little published research on the technology, and one of the
leading vendors in the area – BK Systems – no longer seems to exist. The other previously dominant vendor –
neusciences – does not appear to be pursuing the technology anymore either.
At the moment there is a lack of sufficient research in retinal technology. Once considered a technology with
great potential, the main supplier in the past (EyeDentify) has gone out of business, with no other vendors
(producing commercial systems) to replace it. The situation will undoubtedly change in the coming years, with
companies such as Retinal Technologies and EyeDentify Europe still in the market, however further academic
and commercial research is required in the retinal technology domain.
Whilst mouse dynamics are often seen on lists of possible biometric technologies (eg. Furnell et al 2000), there
is little (if any) significant research in this area. There are certainly no commercial products and it will be some
time before any appear, if at all (the closest thing appears to be Predictive Media’s use of mouse dynamics in
conjunction with keystroke dynamics and website monitoring to help identify a user in order to tailor
marketing).

OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGIES
Fingerprint and iris technologies have been selected for description as representative of physiological
biometrics. Voice-based technology has been chosen as representative of behavioural biometrics. These
systems have been chosen because they are the most mature and commercially adopted biometric techniques.
Additional information regarding the operation of various biometric technologies can be found in RejmanGreene (2002) and Liu & Silverman (2001).
Fingerprint
Fingerprint recognition relies on the fact that no two fingerprints are identical, making it a unique identifier for
an individual. Whilst having been used by Governments, the Military and Law Enforcement agencies for some
time, it is increasingly being considered in regular commercial applications as a method of authentication.
Fingerprint recognition usually involves identifying minutiae (the points were ridges end or divide), arches,
loops and whorls in order to create a statistical template used to compare with samples during use. The chances
of reproducing a fingerprint for fraudulent use are greatly reduced by not storing an actual physical image of the
fingerprint. The sensors used to capture the print utilise digital/optical, thermal, capacitance or ultrasonic
technologies.
The major advantage of fingerprint technology is that of acceptance. It is a well-known and understood form of
identification, and has a reliable reputation. The accuracy, ease of use and installation of the technology are also
advantages.
The major disadvantage relates to problems arising from injury to the user’s finger – eg. simple cuts or burns
can significantly impact the system’s performance. This problem will be discussed in greater detail later in the
paper.
Iris
Iris recognition establishes a person's identity through scanning the unique patterns found in the iris. It is a noninvasive, non-contact process where a stereo camera takes a digital image of the iris. The image is then
compared with a template to verify the identity of the user.
The advantages of iris recognition are many. The iris is an internal organ and thus highly protected, yet still
visible externally from a distance. Combined with the stability of the iris pattern over time and its high degree
of randomness, it becomes an ideal biometric. There is limited genetic penetration (eg. identical twins have
different irises), and liveliness testing is available through the changing pupil size.
The disadvantages of iris recognition relate to the nature of the iris inside the eye. It can be obscured by
eyelashes, eyelids or reflections, deforms non-elastically with changes in pupil size, and moves considerably.
The technology tends also to have negative connotations due to perceptions that it may affect one’s vision
(Daugman, 2000).
Voice
The features of a person’s voice may be used for a variety of purposes, such as authentication, identification,
classification, differentiation and lie detection. These are generally referred to as ‘speaker recognition’
(Markowitz 2002), however only speaker authentication and identification are of concern here.
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Three different methods of operation for speaker authentication and identification exist. Text-prompted is a
challenge-response form where the system requests the user to say a particular word or phrase, text-dependent
involves using a fixed “voice password” which does not change, and text-independent allows the user to say any
arbitrary set of words. A Linear Prediction technique is often used to create a “voiceprint” at enrolment that is
used in subsequent comparisons.
The text-prompted method has the advantages of a lower model size (as the password is not stored), the user
does not need to remember a password, and liveliness testing is assured due to the randomly changing textprompts. (Broun et al, 2001) More generally, the advantages of voice authentication centre on its versatility. It
can be used over the telephone for password resets, help identify criminals robbing a bank, keep track of people
on parole or even keep journal secrets safe (Markowitz 2002). Additionally, it is much cheaper to implement
than other biometric systems such as those using the fingerprint or iris. This is due to it not requiring dedicated
hardware. However, it is important to note that poorer quality hardware (such as the telephone) decreases the
performance of the system significantly (Ramachandran 2002).

COMPARISON OF TECHNOLOGIES
In order to compare the biometric technologies, several criteria have been selected. These appear to be the most
significant in the literature, and were also mentioned in the pilot study interview (with practitioners involved in
commercial biometrics):
•

security – the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information used

•

cost – the financial cost involved in adopting a particular technology

•

accuracy - the ability to correctly match a biometric sample with its template

•

visibility – the level of direct interaction required during system usage

•

perceived invasiveness – the apparent degree one’s self is impinged upon

•

privacy invasiveness – the disruption to one’s ability to control personal information

Further justification for the selection of these criteria is provided in the section following the comparisons,
‘Development of a Preliminary Issues Model’. There are other issues important in the overall adoption of a
biometric system (eg. the sensitivity of the information being protected) that are not relevant to a comparison of
different techniques and therefore not included here. They have, however, been included in the section dealing
with the development of the research model.
A summary of the technologies and issues is depicted in Table 1 below:
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Table 1 Summary of biometric technologies and issues
Security
Most research in the biometric field has centred on technical feasibility, new algorithms, techniques and so forth.
It is perhaps a reflection of the relative immaturity of the field that there has been little research into the security
aspects of the technology – such as the possibility of spoofing, replay or brute-force attacks.
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The opportunities for replay attacks (where the digital biometric signal is ‘replayed’ back to the system, fooling
it into thinking that the actual biometric has been presented) depends significantly on the way the system is
implemented. Bolle et al (2002) provide a possible solution involving the server generating a pseudo-random
challenge that is received by the client and used to create a response dependent on both the challenge and the
biometric. Thus the information transmitted varies each time. Bolle et al (2002) also analyse the effectiveness
of brute-force attacks on biometrics, however the factors involved do not provide any particular distinction
between the different biometric techniques.
The popularity of fingerprint technology has resulted in it being trialled for spoofing more than other techniques.
van der Putte & Keuning (2000) were able to defeat all six fingerprint systems they tried, both with co-operation
from the authorised person and also without (eg. lifting the print from a glass surface or the scanner itself). The
techniques they used were not expensive nor particularly complex – the inability of fingerprint scanners to
accurately detect the liveliness of the ‘finger’ was the main problem. More recently, Matsumoto et al (2002)
was able to defeat all eleven fingerprint systems that were trialled by using fake silicon and gelatine
‘fingerprints’. These findings also highlight the need for independent testing apart from the claims of the
vendors who produce biometric systems.
van der Putte & Keuning (2000) highlight the security problems with fingerprint authentication in that it is “the
only system where the biometrical characteristic can be stolen without the owner noticing it or reasonably being
able to prevent it.” (p13) This is a great concern for the security of the technology, so much so that the Atos
Origin consultants consider fingerprint scanners the least secure means of verification except for keystroke
dynamics. Their ranking of the various technologies is shown in the comparison table(Table 1).
Cost
The financial cost of a biometric system varies markedly, depending on many factors besides the simple cost of
the hardware and software associated with the technique. This is particularly significant since different
techniques are better suited to different applications (eg. behavioural for continuous monitoring), impacting the
total cost of the application. For the purposes of this comparison however, we assume that as far as possible, all
areas of the system are identical except for the particular biometric technique being considered.
The developments in fingerprint technology have resulted in fairly low prices for sensors (which are
incorporated into specific devices) – as low as US$2.50 for a swipe sensor and US$12.50 for an area sensor
(Biometric Technology Today, 2002). Most other technologies (eg. hand geometry and iris recognition) are not
as mature and therefore tend to be more expensive. Iris technology demands prices in the range of thousands of
dollars for physical security solutions, and several hundred dollars for desktop-level devices (eg. Panasonic
Authenticam). Lower hardware costs required for the behavioural techniques (voice, signature and keystroke)
result in overall lower cost, particularly for large-scale deployments. These differences in price are reflected in
Table 1.
Perceived Level of Invasiveness
No literature was found relating to the perceived level of invasiveness of various biometric techniques. Deane et
al (1995) and Furnell et al (2000) consider overall acceptability but do not attempt to discover empirically the
reasons for such acceptability. The ratings for perceived invasiveness are therefore based on knowledge of the
technique and expected attitudes of the public.
Invasiveness is largely dependent on the level and type of physical contact involved, and the possibility of harm
being caused. Thus the behavioural techniques (voice, signature, keyboard) invade the user least, followed by
the physiological technique of facial recognition. Hand-associated techniques (fingerprint, hand geometry) have
a moderate level of perceived invasiveness, since there is some contact (eg. an optical scan of the finger) –
however, it is partly negated by the hand not being a particularly ‘sensitive’ area of the body. The eye, on the
other hand, is considered much more sensitive and fragile. Iris recognition therefore has a greater perceived
invasiveness – despite the technique essentially involving only a photograph of the eye, it is easier to perceive a
possibility of harm compared with a simple scan of a fingerprint or photograph of the face (see Table 1).
Other biometric techniques with far higher levels of invasiveness include retina scanning, DNA sampling, and
biochipping. These techniques are currently not in commercial use, however.
Visibility
The visibility of a biometric system depends mainly on the way in which it is implemented (particularly in a
continuous monitoring sense), not the particular technology involved. However, some technologies –
particularly behavioural – do lend themselves to being used in systems where low visibility is required. For
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example, a voice-based telephone system may utilise voice authentication technology invisibly, a documentmanagement system incorporate dynamic signature technology, or an operating system integrating keystroke
dynamics. In each case, the user would be prompted for additional authentication information (eg. a password)
only if the biometric reading varied too far from the template.
Physiological techniques tend to have greater visibility since the process involved in authentication tends not to
be part of the regular usage of any application or system (as opposed to a technology like keyboard dynamics
which needs only typing information). Thus the user must stop and perform the particular operation for the
specific purpose of identification or verification. The exception to this could be in face recognition, where a
mounted camera could be used to automatically provide access if an authorised user appeared before it – and
indeed remove access should the user walk away during usage of the system. Table 1 shows the differences in
visibility ratings for behavioural and physiological techniques.
Privacy Invasiveness
The level to which a biometric technique invades a person’s privacy is dependent on the uniqueness of the
biometric, the sensitivity of the information, and the possibility for combining data with other databases. A
summary of the levels of privacy invasiveness of each technology can be seen in Table 1.
Behavioural techniques such as voice, signature and keystroke tend to be used mainly for verification, not
identification. This is a result of the general limited uniqueness of behavioural biometrics (or possibly our
current inability to detect differences to the required degree) – however it also means that one’s privacy is
impinged upon less by such techniques. Unique identifiers such as the fingerprint and iris open up the
possibility of combining databases of personal information, or linking up to police databases of criminals.
Bolle et al (2002) provides a creative solution to the privacy problems of unique identifiers. They suggest the
use of “cancellable biometrics”, where a non-invertible distortion transform is applied to every presentation of
the biometric information. Thus a fingerprint image is distorted at enrolment, and subsequently only distorted
images are ever compared. The actual fingerprint of the user is never stored, and since the transform algorithm
is non-invertible, even if someone obtains the algorithm and the transformed biometric, the original biometric
cannot be recovered. This technique also solves the problem of the inability to reissue a new biometric should it
become compromised (as one would do, say if a password were compromised), a problem with the intrinsic link
between person and biometric. A new transform can simply be issued if a compromise occurs. Bolle et al
(2002) apply this technique to face, fingerprint, iris and voice biometrics.
Facial and hand geometry techniques lack the identifying capabilities of fingerprint and iris. They are, however,
more favourable from a privacy perspective because such information is less sensitive. Photographs of faces are
commonplace on existing identification cards (although such ubiquity could be used for comparison/joining of
databases, IBG 2003), and a set of numbers representing the size and structure of a person’s hand would also not
be of great concern. Similarly, signatures are already stored on countless documents, and keystroke or voice
statistics are fairly meaningless outside of the system that created them.
Accuracy
The accuracy of biometric systems has been the subject of much research, since it is clearly one of the main
determinants of its feasibility. As mentioned previously, accuracy is determined by the error rates of the system.
The False Non Match Rate (FNMR, Type I error) is the percentage chance of rejecting a match that should have
been accepted, whilst the False Match Rate (FMR, Type II error) is the percentage chance of accepting a match
that should have been rejected. They are analogous to the terms False Reject Rate (FRR) and False Accept Rate
(FAR), which relate to matching a sample within the entire population (ie identification) rather than between a
single pair of samples (ie verification). Thus if the population is very large, the FRR and FAR will be
substantially greater than the FNMR and FMR (technically, FAR = 1-(1-FMR)N and FRR = 1-(1-FNMR)N
where N is the number of templates in the database).
There tends to be a trade-off between FNMR and FMR – adjusting the threshold of an algorithm so that the
FNMR is low tends to raise the FMR, and attempting to lower the FMR tends to raise the FNMR (see Figure 1).
The point where FNMR equals FMR is known as the equal-error rate (EER), and is often used to quickly assess
the performance of a biometric system.
The Failure to Enrol Rate (FER) measures the percentage of users that cannot use a system, eg. a fingerprint
sensor that is unable to detect worn fingerprints of manual labourers. When a user cannot enrol, an alternative
form of authentication must be provided, and this may weaken the overall security of the system (eg. resorting to
reliance on a PIN).
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The National Physical Laboratory in the UK did the most comprehensive testing of comparative biometric
technologies in 2000. Figure 1 shows the results of the relative accuracy of each product, as the threshold is
manipulated. The iris technique is clearly the most accurate, with FAR of 0.0001 and FRR of 0.25 (only one
measurement exists due to the fixed threshold of the product).

Figure 1 Accuracy of different biometric technologies: the FNMR vs FMR trade-off
(best of 3 attempts) (Mansfield et al., 2001, p.11)
Research in fingerprint matching is relatively mature compared to other biometric technologies. The results of
the Second International Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC2002) are indicative of this, with
outstanding results from some entrants. The most successful algorithm in FVC2002 achieved an average EER
of only 0.19%, and an average ZeroFMR (the lowest FNMR for FMR=0) of 0.38%. Thus even if maximum
security is desired (FMR=0% – no false acceptances), according to these results there would be less than one
false rejection per 250 matches.
Despite such positive results, fingerprint technology is influenced by non-ideal factors such as: i) bruises or
injuries on fingers, ii) peeling of the skin on the finger, and iii) dryness of the finger (Jain et al., 1999b). Optical
fingerprint readers are particularly susceptible to artificial marks. Although fingerprints do not naturally change
over time, fingerprints can wear down throughout life (particularly with manual labourers), reducing the
accuracy of fingerprint matching. Despite these concerns, the overall accuracy of the technology is still quite
high.
In the face recognition field, the Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) 2002 provides a faithful indication of
the accuracy of commercially available products. FRVT 2002 was the largest evaluation of automatic face
recognition to date, using 37,437 individuals and multiple images of each individual taken on different days.
The most accurate product had a FMR100 of 10% and a FMR1000 of 18%. These rates vary depending on
characteristics such as whether the image is taken indoors (indoor images have about a 40% lower FMR100),
the age of the individual (older people are easier to identify), and the time elapsed between the database and new
images (the greater the time the more difficult the identification).
Despite great improvements in facial recognition technology, there is still a long way to go to reach the accuracy
levels of technologies such as fingerprint recognition – current performance is comparable to that of fingerprint
technology in 1998 (http://torch.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/n03-04.htm). The use of three-dimensional
morphable models was shown to raise performance in FRVT 2002, indicating a possible avenue for further
development (Phillips et al., 2003).
The largest and most recent study of iris recognition performance was conducted by Cambier (2002) for Iridian
Technologies (the dominant maker of commercial iris recognition products). There were 983,736,000 template
pairs, and tests were carried out using a variety of HD (Hamming Distance) thresholds. With an appropriate
threshold for the database, no false matches were observed. The estimated FMR was 3.0 x 10-11, and the
estimated FAR 3.0 x 10-6. Similarly impressive results with the Daugman algorithm (the basis for Iridian and
essentially all current iris recognition products) have been achieved by Daugman (2003) and the UK National
Physical Laboratory (2001).
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For voice authentication, the method of operation (text-prompted, text-dependant or text-independent) plays a
large role in determining the accuracy of a voice authentication system. Text-independent operation is
significantly worse than text-prompted operation – Lamel & Gauvain (2000) obtained an EER of approximately
6.5-7% for text-independent compared with around 2% for text-prompted.
Lamel & Gauvain (2000) also showed that linguistic content influences accuracy. When using digit strings, the
EER was 4.1%, with sentences, 2.7%, and SEPT (five phonetically controlled sentences), 2.3%. SEPT
sentences performed better due to the smaller number of phonetic contexts (allowing for more accurate acoustic
methods to be estimated), they were easy to remember and pronounce (the other sentences were taken from a
newspaper), and users’ familiarity with digit strings likely resulted in worse pronunciation, adversely
influencing accuracy. Undoubtedly there are many more factors involved in the complex process of speaker
authentication.
Speaker authentication may be carried out over a number of different mediums, and the quality of these play a
considerable role in the accuracy of the system. Ramachandran et al. (2002) obtained the following equal error
rates using a text-dependent system: landline 0.84%, cellular 3.71%, multimedia (through a PC microphone)
0.03%. Overall, the speaker authentication domain is still quite immature, with great variations in accuracy rates
and much research still underway in regards to the best algorithms and techniques.
Hand geometry-based verification systems have been in existence since the early 1970s, however there is little
open literature available, with much of it in the form of patents (Jain et al., 1999). The prototype system
developed by Jain et al. (1999) and tested with 50 users had reasonable results (for a prototype), eg. with a 0.1
FAR the FRR was 8%. The results of the NPL study (Figure 1) are far better due to the use of a commercial
product. Hand-geometry has the advantage over (particularly optical) fingerprint techniques due to its ability to
function well despite dirt, sweat or worn prints. This benefits accuracy by providing consistent data in varying
conditions, although there are possible hygiene concerns as sweat and dirt accumulate on the sensor. Overall, it
is difficult to judge the accuracy given the little information, however the NPL results and the technique’s
maturity and flexibility suggest that it is reasonable.
Dynamic signature analysis has the advantage of being acceptable due to its pre-existing usage. However, it
suffers from an accuracy standpoint, due to the sometimes large intra-class variation (ie an individual’s signature
may change significantly). Jain et al. (2002) undertook an experiment using 1232 signatures of 102 individuals,
with the best results of a 2.8% FRR and 1.6% FAR. These results used writer-dependent thresholds (computed
from the reference signatures), as opposed to a common threshold (which resulted in 3.3% FRR and 2.7% FAR).
Despite a significant amount of research into keystroke dynamics both prior to 1990 (see review in Joyce &
Gupta, 1990), and post-1990 (Monrose & Rubin, 2000), there seems to be little in the way of commercial
products and therefore accuracy data. Due to its promising nature for continuous monitoring however (Furnell
et al., 2000) it has been included in this comparison. A study involving 63 users by Monrose & Rubin (2000)
achieved correct identification rates varying between 83.22% and 92.14%. Greater accuracy is achieved using
structured text rather than arbitrary ‘free-text’, which would favour applications such as a password-based
system. As a verification system alone however, the accuracy is far lower than other techniques. Table 1
provides a simple summary of the varying degrees of accuracy of the biometric techniques.
It is clear that there is no single biometric technique that is ideal for all circumstances. Those with high
accuracy (iris, fingerprint) tend to have potentially greater privacy invasiveness, whilst behavioural techniques
(voice, signature, keystroke) have lower accuracy and yet lower invasiveness (both privacy and bodily). Thus it
is all the more important that a decision to implement a biometric authentication system be carefully considered,
with all aspects taken into account – including those in the issues model, which follows.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PRELIMINARY ISSUES MODEL
The revised technology acceptance model (TAM) by Davis et al (1989) provides a foundation for understanding
the issues surrounding the adoption of biometric technology. In this context, the traditional constructs of
perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use must be moulded somewhat from their original definitions to be
appropriate for biometric systems.
We propose that a number of factors and issues contribute to the formation of perceived usefulness and
perceived ease of use in a biometric context. These are outlined in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Proposed adaptation of the revised technology acceptance model (Davis 1989)
Davis defined perceived usefulness to be “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system
would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis 1989, p.320). The perceived usefulness of a biometric
authentication system is not as directly related to job performance as the systems Davis probably had in mind
when developing the TAM. However, given the importance of security in today’s corporate environment, the
protection of physical assets or information for which employees have responsibility is a fundamental aspect of
job performance – with serious consequences should they fail. Even without a direct responsibility for security,
any breaches would negatively impact the company, whose good health employees are reliant upon. Thus we
define perceived usefulness more broadly to be the degree to which a person believes that using a particular
biometric system would fulfil the organisation’s security access requirements in a particular domain.
Based on this definition, the security, accuracy, cost, information sensitivity and reliability (Deane et al 1995,
for latter three) of a biometric system are determinants of perceived usefulness. Only the first three factors were
considered in the comparison, since information sensitivity is independent of the technology, and reliability was
felt to be determined more by particular products (and their maturity) than the technique in general – however
this may change in the future.
Security relates to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information that is being processed and
stored by a system (Institute for Telecommunications Sciences Telecom Glossary 2000). In the biometric
context, security is determined by factors such as the ease of counterfeit (fake biometric), the possibility of
replay attacks and the susceptibility to brute-force attacks (Ernst 2002, Bolle et al 2002). The greater the
security of the system, the better it will be at fulfilling the organisation’s security access requirements and
therefore the greater perceived usefulness.
Commercial biometric systems are generally quite immature and may utilise expensive hardware and software.
Financial cost is a significant concern in determining perceived usefulness, since system deployment cost may
be too great to justify the protection of the particular information or asset in question. The various technologies
differ markedly in their cost (pilot study interview, 10 June).
Accuracy is the degree to which the system is able to correctly match a biometric sample with its pre-existing
template (for either identification or verification) in a real-world setting. The accuracy of a biometric system is
dependent on its error rates, namely the False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and Failure
to Enrol Rate (FER). Over time these are affected by the stability of the biometric, eg. whether one’s iris will
change in a year. Accuracy is perhaps one of the biggest determinants of both perceived usefulness – since an
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inaccurate system will accept impostors, compromising security – and perceived ease of use, since the system
will reject legitimate users and cause frustration and wasted time.
The sensitivity of the information being protected is a determinant of perceived usefulness, as the negative
aspects of a biometric system appear more justified when the sensitivity is greater. This positive correlation
between acceptability of biometric systems and sensitivity of information was found by Deane et al. (1995).
Similarly, an opposite effect was obtained in regards to the acceptability of passwords – it was evident that the
survey respondents were familiar with the their shortcomings.
The reliability of a system, “the probability that the system remains successful (does not fail) in achieving its
intended objectives” (Zahedi 1987) will always be important in determining its perceived usefulness (simply by
its definition). For a biometric system, however, its ongoing success is even more important due to its use in a
security context.
The TAM definition of perceived ease of use – “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular
system would be free of effort” (Davis 1989, p.320) – does not need any modification to be applicable to a
biometric system. It can be considered as simply another system that people use.
Although similar to regular information systems, a biometric system differs by the intrinsically personal data it
utilises. This leads to information privacy – “the ability of the individual to personally control information
about one’s self” (Stone et al 1983) – becoming very important. The regular privacy issues summarised by
Smith et al (1996) tend to be exacerbated by biometrics, and include:
•

Collection – concern that extensive amounts of personal data are being collected and stored

•

Unauthorised Secondary Use (internal/external) – concern that information is collected for one purpose
but used for another (either internally or externally), without authorisation

•

Improper Access – concern that personal data is available to people not authorised to view or work
with it

•

Errors – concern over inadequate protections against deliberate and accidental errors

•

Combining Data (tangential) – concern that data from disparate databases may be combined into larger
databases
(Smith et al.,1996, p172)

Personal privacy appears to be one of the primary concerns people have when considering biometrics against
traditional authentication techniques. Such concern is quite justified considering the highly personal
information involved – identity theft is taken to a new level if a biometric signal is somehow counterfeited.
With current implementations there is no equivalent of a ‘password reset’ – the information is intrinsically you
(Bolle et al. (2002) propose a helpful technique called ‘cancellable biometrics’ to overcome this problem). The
combination of multiple databases in order to create a profile of one’s details is seemingly made easier through
uniquely identifying biometrics. Similarly, fears have been raised about a ‘big brother’ style monitoring through
the ubiquitous use of biometrics. An ‘electronic trail’ of one’s actions could be traced, thus reducing anonymity
and pseudonymity. Such widespread use of biometric information may arise from function-creep, where
information is used for purposes beyond the original intentions
(Clarke, 2002 and
http://www.epic.org/privacy/biometrics/). Privacy is therefore an influential factor in shaping people’s intention
to use a biometric system, as Figure 2above depicts.
Visibility is the level of direct interaction required of the user to use the system (ie how ‘visible’ the system is to
the user). For a biometric system this is determined mainly by whether it is behaviourally or physiologically
based. It is possible for a behaviourally based biometric approach to be almost invisible, where a continuous
monitoring solution only interrupts when behaviour is deemed atypical. Deane et al. (1995) found that
behaviourally based systems were less acceptable than physiological ones, however Furnell et al. (2000) found
the opposite to be true. Despite the contradictory findings, it is clear that the issue of visibility does play a role
in perceived ease of use and acceptance.
The invasiveness of biometric systems has been mentioned as a major drawback of the technology (Clarke 2002,
Deane et al. 1995). A higher level of invasiveness leads to greater effort required to use the system, where
‘effort’ includes uncomfortableness and stress at possible side effects of usage. It is also linked to the issue of
privacy (see Figure 2, above), since a highly invasive technique tends to reveal information of a more private
nature. It is suggested that we consider perceived invasiveness rather than invasiveness alone, due to the level
of ‘familiarity’ the general public has with biometric technologies from the media/movies. These depictions
tend to shape opinion but do not necessarily reflect the true nature of the technologies involved.
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The level of convenience associated with using the system was felt to be a significant determinant of perceived
ease of use. Since biometric systems do not suffer from things such as forgotten passwords or stolen or lost
tokens, they are arguably more convenient. The greater speed (Deane et al., 1995) and redcued effort involved
in authentication may also raise convenience, eg. speaking a password rather than typing it. Although arguably
different across the various techniques, overall convenience was deemed to be determined mostly by the
particular implementation of the technique (ie the commercial product).

CONCLUSION AND INTENDED RESEARCH
We have seen that there are many issues surrounding the introduction of a biometric authentication system. It is
clear that there is no single biometric technique that is ideal for all circumstances, with some having high
accuracy and yet greater privacy invasiveness (iris, fingerprint), and others having lower accuracy and lower
invasiveness (behavioural techniques). Implementing a biometric authentication system therefore requires
careful planning and management, and a thorough understanding of the acceptance and adoption issues.
With the proposed model of issues developed here, we intend to investigate how these issues correspond to
actual managerial and user attitudes in companies that have already adopted a biometric authentication system.
These case-studies are among the first in this area, and will provide great insights into how these issues exist and
interact. The model will therefore be validated and/or revised, being available for further research leading
toward the development of an implementation methodology for biometric systems that will help alleviate the
acceptance issues.
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